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Abstract—We introduce the challenges to digital forensics in-
troduced by the advent and adoption of technologies, such as
encryption, secure networking, secure processors and anonymous
routing. All potentially render current approaches to digital
forensic investigation unusable. We explain how the Cloud, due to
its global distribution and multi-jurisdictional nature, exacerbates
these challenges. The latest developments in the computing milieu
threaten a complete “evidence blackout” with severe implications
for the detection, investigation and prosecution of cybercrime.
In this paper, we review the current landscape of cloud-based
forensics investigations. We posit a number of potential solu-
tions. Cloud forensic difficulties can only be addressed if we
acknowledge its socio-technological nature, and design solutions
that address both human and technological dimensions. No firm
conclusion is drawn; rather the objective is to present a position
paper, which will stimulate debate in the area and move the
discipline of digital cloud forensics forward. Thus, the paper
concludes with an invitation to further informed debate on this
issue.
Keywords–Cloud Forensics; Challenges
I. INTRODUCTION
The seeds of Cloud Computing were sown back in 1963
when Licklider talked about an “intergalactic computer net-
work” [1]. He had a vision of a global network allowing people
to execute code anywhere and access data anywhere. The world
had to wait for the capacity of the Internet before this dream
would come to fruition. In 1999, Salesforce delivered services
to Enterprise via a website [2]. Soon large companies, such as
Amazon and Microsoft, started to offer enterprise and personal
computing services. Many organisations now use Microsoft’s
Office 365 platform to manage their email and store their
documents. Licklider’s dream has been realised.
Cloud computing offers obvious benefits to companies and
individuals [3]. The costs are reasonable, as compared to
investing in, and maintaining, their own infrastructure.
Yet there is a flip side too, related to those who use com-
puting power for nefarious purposes. When law enforcement
officials investigate crimes it is common practice for them to
seize devices for analysis by forensics experts.
Digital forensics, as a science, emerged as cyber crime
started to increase, and did so to meet the needs of law
enforcement and also to help organisations to reveal the
activities of cyber attackers. Rigorous forensics procedures
emerged and were adopted by forensics investigators [4]. The
advent of the cloud challenges these established procedures,
adding a whole new dimension of complexity to forensics
investigations. Challenges come from technical, stakeholder,
organisational and political levels.
In this paper, we discuss the challenges experienced by the
humans involved in usual and cloud forensics investigations
[5].
Options for a digital forensic response to the emergent
challenges are discussed in the hope of provoking discussion
on a response that is grounded not solely in technology but
rather one that is multi-disciplinary incorporating elements
from various stakeholders in the criminal justice process (law
makers, law enforcement) and society at large.
We commence by discussing the progress of technology
and introducing forensics in Section II. We then introduce
the concept of cloud computing in Section III. We continue
our discussion by advancing the argument that progress, in
the shape of security technology, may lead to a situation in
which information only exists “in the clear” (i.e., unencrypted)
as it is input and output (Sections IV and V). All storage
and computation will be performed upon a provably securely
encrypted representation, resulting in an encryption boundary
encircling all data.
We contemplate the concept of a “robust” system and
discuss how such a system might arise from the encryption
boundary. The consequences for the digital forensics commu-
nity of the existence of such a system are examined. We also
address the concept of the cloud and its impact on digital
forensics.
We then discuss existing responses to individual threats
in Section VI. Consideration is given to the combined threat
and to the technical, legal and ethical aspects of the problem
including community roles and attitudes to the problem, taking
into account the need to maintain evidential integrity and con-
tinuity. Some possible digital forensic responses are discussed,
including their technical feasibility, ethical desirability and
current admissibility in Section VII. Section VIII concludes by
inviting debate on the technical, ethical and legal consequences
of the various response options.
II. TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS & FORENSICS
An ethical paradox lies at the heart of all security research:
one that presents a problem to the digital forensics community.
The more secure we make things, the less we can get into
them when we need to. It is possible that the ordinary security
researcher does not worry too much about this on a day-to-day
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basis. Happy with the assumption that they are on the side of
the “good guys”, and that their job is to keep the “bad guys”
out, they continue to develop ever stronger encryption, more
user-friendly security systems and generally, with a defenders
mindset, build ever higher digital castle walls.
One specific kind of researcher, namely the digital forensic
scientist, is likely to regard these fortifications with trepidation.
The obvious question is: “What happens if the ‘bad guys’
have seen how we secure our “valuables” and use the same
measures?”
Since Kerckhoff’s principle [6] mandates that the “protec-
tion plans” should be in the public domain, we must assume
that the bad guys will have access to, and employ, the same
technology as the good guys.
Current digital forensic techniques can, to some extent,
be said to work by accident. It is only because the normal
functioning of hardware, operating systems and applications
leave artefacts lying around that the reconstruction of user
activity is possible. Less sophisticated cyber criminals might
still leave sufficient cybertrails at the scene of the cybercrime.
Garfinkel [7] has argued that we have been living in a “golden
age” of digital forensics. To date, these artefacts and the
inevitable human fallibility in implementing “secure” systems
have meant that the digital forensic investigator has been able
to sneak into the digital storage mechanism and look around.
However, cyber security, and its uptake by criminal ele-
ments, will inevitably challenge forensics investigators. The
consequences of this may include an “evidence blackout.” How
we could respond to this is the subject of this paper.
It could be argued that we do not need to worry about
this yet. It might be the case that human fallibility will always
defeat attempts to make systems secure. However, improving
security seems to be the raison d’eˆtre of the larger security
research community and their techniques will inevitably be
embraced by criminal elements.
The literature on digital security often identifies the human
as the weakest point in any digital security system. What
happens if this is reversed and the human, in this case the
cyber criminal, becomes the strongest link? How will greater
awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of digital investiga-
tions help cyber criminals to obfuscate their cybertrails? Recent
cases have suggested that this era might well have dawned.
Two examples demonstrate this. The first is the San Bernadino
case [8] where the US government attempted to force Apple to
help them to access data on iPhones. The second is that in the
days following the Texas church shooting the FBI complained
about not being able to access the shooter’s phone [9]. These
are evidence of a significant phase change: a new challenge
for law enforcement.
There are also signs from Western governments that the
use of encryption by subversives is making counter-terrorism
efforts challenging [10], [11], [12], [13].
III. CLOUD COMPUTING
The term “Cloud Computing” has various overloaded
meanings conventionally categorised as “software as service”,
“platform as service”, “infrastructure as service” etc., and is a
growing area of interest in the digital investigation community
[14].
Cloud forensics can be defined as “a hybrid forensics
approach (e.g., remote, virtual network, live, large-scale, thin-
client, thick client) towards the generation of digital evidence”
[15].
One particular feature of some cloud computing systems
likely to prove troublesome to forensic investigators is the idea
of the distributed, fragmented file system. Originally conceived
partly for reasons of data security and mapping easily onto the
cloud paradigm, it has its origins in the work of Shamir [16]
and Rabin [17], with implementations such as OceanStore [18],
PASIS [19] and more recently the work of Mei et al. [20]. Such
systems achieve security by storing a file not on one remote
networked file server but by splitting a file into fragments and
storing each fragment on (potentially geographically separate)
servers.
The underlying idea is that if one server is attacked and
compromised, then the attackers still do not have access
to a file — that requires the more difficult proposition of
compromising all the servers across which the file is stored.
Couple this with full disk encryption, with each fragment
protected by a different key, and we have a perfect storm.
Anyone wishing to reconstruct a file is thus potentially faced
with the theoretical problem of decrypting multiple encryption
regimes and also the practical problems associated with data
fragments existing in multiple jurisdictions, and possibly even
the knowledge of the file fragments’ locations being likewise
encrypted and distributed.
Figure 1. Fragmented file storage in the cloud computing paradigm
In an Internet-wide cloud context, different parts of the
same file will be in different computers, different countries and
different jurisdictions (See Figure 1). The practical difficulties
of obtaining the file are thus indeed daunting. Uptake of the
cloud computing paradigm is widespread [21].
IV. INDIVIDUAL TECHNICAL THREATS
In this section, a number of security technologies that
may threaten an “evidence blackout” are individually exam-
ined before we discuss the consequences of deploying them
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together. The techniques/technologies considered are: full disk
encryption, secure network communication, secure processors,
homomorphic encryption and anonymous routing.
A. Encryption
It is worth briefly examining the state of the art of encryp-
tion technology and its adoption.
Current encryption techniques are based on the idea of
computational security. Given encryption keys of sufficient
length, cryptanalysis requires infeasible amounts of computing
power and/or lengths of time. The existence of techniques
and/or computing power able to tackle current cyphers in a
meaningful time-scale is not acknowledged by those likely to
possess them. Encryption has thus reached the point of being
“practically unbreakable”.
B. Full Disk Encryption (FDE)
Current digital forensic techniques depend largely on arte-
facts left behind on disk, both explicitly, and as a by-product
by the operating system. The first “dark cloud” on the horizon
is that these techniques do not perform well when faced with
serious attempts at concealment by encrypting full disks [22].
Full disk encryption allows the entire contents of a disk to
be protected by a password/key scheme, i.e., no-one without
the key (digital investigators included) can read the contents
of the disk. To achieve this, a layer is introduced into the
Operating System between the file system and storage media
device driver. Any data being written to the disk is encrypted
on-the-fly as it passes through this layer. Conversely, any data
being read is decrypted, provided that the correct decryption
key has been provided at the beginning of a session.
The advantage of such a scheme is that it is largely
transparent to the user — no special actions are required to
conceal particular items of data as everything is automatically
encrypted/decrypted. Popular implementations of this technol-
ogy include VeraCrypt [23] and Bitlocker [24].
C. Secure network communication
The transmission of strongly encrypted messages, once the
province of governments, military and intelligence services is
within the grasp of both the ordinary citizen, and the criminal.
HTTP Secure (HTTPS), Virtual Private Network (VPN), Inter-
net Protocol Security (IPSec) and all have achieved widespread
adoption.
D. Secure Processors
Secure processor technology promises to do for memory
image forensics what full disk encryption did for disk exami-
nation — i.e., render it impossible. In a system with a secure
processor, all data outside the boundary of the processor itself
i.e., anything in random access memory (RAM), is encrypted.
Both program instructions and data are decrypted on-the-fly
with block ciphers as data is shifted to and from the various
system buses (See Figure 2).
Having their origins in systems such as Aegis [25] and
Bastion [26], secure processors were originally intended to
provide a secure environment for embedded control systems
but continue to develop towards high-end systems. Although
they are not yet widely adopted in desktop level systems
(mainly due to speed issues in dealing with the large cryp-
tographic overhead) working systems are emerging.
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Figure 2. Secure Processor Architecture (MBR=Master Boot Record;
MAR=Memory Address Register; ALU=Arithmetic Logic Unit )
E. Homomorphic Encryption
Homomorphic encryption (HE) is the idea that computation
can be performed directly on the encrypted representation of
data without the need first to decrypt it. First proposed by
Rivest et al. [27] it would enable data not only to be stored
securely in the cloud, but also to be processed there without
fear of compromise by a corrupt cloud service provider.
The work of Gentry [28], based on ideal lattice cryptog-
raphy, has shown that such a scheme is viable, but currently
the computational overhead involved means that it is not yet
practical. Efforts to discover a more computationally tractable
scheme continue [29].
F. Anonymous Routing
Due to the nature of the protocols underlying the operation
of the Internet, it is possible to identify the source and destina-
tion of network traffic. Even if encryption is in place, it is thus
possible to establish that two parties are in communication.
Figure 3. Onion Routing
The advent of anonymous routing (e.g., onion routing as
embodied in the The Onion Router (TOR) protocol [30])
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removes this source of evidence. The TOR works by separating
the concerns of identity and routing. It forwards messages
randomly though a network of TOR servers (nodes), with each
one applying a layer of encryption (hence the onion metaphor)
before forwarding the packet to the next node or ultimately
its intended destination. This prevents both the source and
destination of the message from being known by every node
and prevents traffic analysis (See Figure 3).
Whilst current onion routing implementations have their
weaknesses (various attacks against the anonymity have been
demonstrated), systems such as the TOR network have demon-
strated their viability. Such techniques are available to those
with sufficient knowledge and reason to hide the origin and
destination of their incoming and outgoing data.
V. THE COMBINATION OF THREATS
Although the threat of encryption has been identified previ-
ously in work such as that of Garfinkel [7] and Seigfried et al.
[31], digital forensics has thus far managed to keep evidence
flowing by reducing reliance on the initial acquisition strategy
of imaging cold systems and resorting to live imaging/live
forensics. How well this approach would scale should the need
for it become widespread remains to be seen.
Due to the threats outlined in the previous section it is
possible to envisage a computing system in which the only
place that data exists “in the clear” (i.e., in unencrypted form)
is internally in the processor, during input (mouse, keyboard
events, etc.) and when formatted for human consumption i.e.,
display/rendering (and hence the video RAM, audio and printer
buffer etc.). Anything stored in either primary or backing
store, or in transit over a communication channel is likely
to be strongly encrypted. Thanks to the cloud, homomorphic
encryption and anonymous routing threats, not only will any
evidence be encrypted, it will also be difficult to find which
machine it is on or even where it is physically located. This
would lead to an “evidence blackout” as current approaches
to investigation (largely based on disk and RAM images) will
fail.
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Figure 4. A Robust System
In the remainder of this paper, such a system is referred
to as a “robust” system (see Figure 4). We define a robust
system as one which, when implemented and operated without
error, maintains data in an unencrypted form to the least extent
commensurate with the fundamental operations of computing.
The cloud is essentially an instantiation of Figure 4 but
also spans jurisdictions and continents.
VI. RESPONSES TO THREATS
This section begins by examining existing responses to the
individual threats and then argues that such responses may be
ineffective against the combined threat of the “robust” system.
A. Response to the encryption threat
An obvious approach to the encryption-based threats would
seem to be to attack the encryption that protects “robust
systems”. Over time, resources and a concentrated research
effort the technologies that make up the “robust system” might
well be broken and a way found to reveal the data needed for
forensic reconstruction. This would, however, be a something
of an “own-goal” for the computer security community that has
been making computers progressively harder to break into. The
same technologies that protect the terrorist’s plot also guard
individual privacy, the world’s e-commerce systems and bank
accounts. We, as a society, ought to have no interest in breaking
this encryption other than to identify weaknesses in protecting
our own data.
B. Response to Full Disk Encryption (FDE)
Rather than use a technical approach to get around the
protection offered by FDE, the UK response (as embodied
in Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) Part III,
Section 49 [32]) has been one based on legislation. Failure to
disclose a password/decryption key following the service of an
appropriate court order is now an offence carrying a maximum
penalty of a two year custodial sentence (or 5 years in the
case of a threat to national security). In the year 2014/2015,
37 “Section 49” notices were issued. 22 refused to comply and
three were convicted [33].
It is interesting to note that the initial response to FDE,
when it emerged as a threat, was not to try to produce a
faster decryption technique, but rather a move towards live-
forensics in which a logical image of a machine is taken via
a login session during which the necessary decryption keys
have already been provided. This move may not merely be
because of the undoubted practical difficulty in producing such
a technique, but rather that the research cryptographers and
cryptanalysts are on the same side. This observation leads
to the notion that the threats outlined above should not be
considered purely as a computer science problem, but rather
as one to which operational solutions might also be applied.
C. Response to Anonymous Routing
When, during World War 2, the cryptanalysts of Bletchley
Park were faced with a “blackout” of decrypted signals traffic
due to a change in enemy ciphers, some level of useful
intelligence was derived from the practice of “traffic analysis”.
Crudely stated, this allowed the origin and destination of a
message to be identified even if the content of the message
could not be deciphered. By correlating the volume of traffic
between known signal stations, areas of significant enemy
activity could be identified. Unfortunately, faced with a similar
blackout on intercepting internet traffic due to securely en-
crypted communications, modern digital forensic investigators
may be denied even this limited option.
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1) TOR Weaknesses: The current implementation of TOR
is vulnerable to certain attacks, which could offer a means of
traffic analysis as evidence [34], [35]. However, work is on-
going to remove those vulnerabilities [36]
D. Response to Robust Security.
Currently, responses to the combined threat would be
difficult, primarily because of the way that the cloud makes the
problem trans-jurisdictional. This presents the twin problems
of practical international cooperation and the differing legal
attitudes to encryption.
E. Response to Cloud
The most appropriate responses to the threats posed by
cloud computing lie outwith the purely technical domain and
are more concerned with obtaining the cooperation of the cloud
providers and jurisdictions where the servers are located.
VII. SOLUTIONS
This section outlines some possible options for maintaining
access to evidence in the face of individual threats combining
to offer “robust” security. This paper does not seek to suggest
that such solutions are either desirable or practical, merely that
they are technical possibilities.
A. Acquire evidence that is in the clear
The concept of an “attack surface” is familiar in the
computer security world. It seems reasonable in the role-
reversed world of the digital investigator trying legitimately
to gain access to a suspect system. Whilst the “attack surface”
of the “robust system” is minimal it is not non-existent. In
the short-term, one technical response to the encryption-based
threats is increased reliance on live forensics. Depending as it
does on gaining access to a suspect system whilst it is turned
on, and while the user logged in with decryption keys having
been supplied, it is an option with its practical difficulties.
The challenge here is to provide law enforcement with the
legislative framework and operational capability routinely to
use such techniques on a large scale.
Other technical means of exploiting the reduced attack sur-
face include covert surveillance of screen and printer output by
video or the Van Eck technique [37], for example. Difficulties
here are obtaining permission to mount the surveillance and
the logistics of putting suitable equipment in place, undetected.
The “robust system” concept includes the idea of perfect
implementation and, of course, practical systems rarely are.
The greatest source of potential weakness of any cryptosystem
can be human error, and it is thus reasonable to conjecture
that exploiting security implementation or human errors may
continue to provide an evidence source long into the future.
B. Black-bag techniques
The hacker community has (and continues to have) great
success in gaining illegal access to insufficiently-secured sys-
tems, both by technical means and by social engineering.
The adoption of some of their techniques (e.g., “black-bag”
cryptanalysis [38]) to provide evidence would be challenging
from the current rigid legal point of view on admissibility of
evidence and the issue of “forensic soundness” [39]. It may be
that this stance needs to be modified in order to allow evidence
recovered using non-standard means.
Two examples of techniques that have emerged from this
community that might be useful are:
• The use of key-loggers (both software and hardware)
is a well-known hacking technique. However, employ-
ing it for evidence gathering counts as the intercep-
tion of communication and thus requires appropriate
authorisation.
• The Firewire direct memory access (DMA) hack
[40] allows direct access to a system’s memory via a
firewire port. It offered a means of rapidly imaging
a target system’s RAM (and potentially the disk)
without the need to install and execute software on
the target (or indeed alter the state of the RAM).
C. Forensic Readiness/Analysable by design
One possible mitigation might be to universally adopt the
discipline of “forensic readiness” [41], in which all systems
record their activities and make such a (cryptographically
protected) record accessible to law enforcement in a retro-
spective manner, as required. Three questions emerge: (a) is it
technically possible? (b) is it practical? and (c) is it desirable?
1) Technical Feasibility: The question of possibility can be
broken down into recording and access aspects.
• Recording Part of the discipline of forensic readiness
deals with the configuring of operating systems and
applications to record their operation in sufficient
detail to enable meaningful reconstruction of their
usage [42]. Such techniques are commonly deployed
on organisational systems rather than those of the
private home user. Various suggestions as to how to
make operating systems leave analysable artefacts as
part of their natural operation have also been put
forward, including [43]. These arguments coupled
with the ever-increasing capacity of storage device
(and consequent decrease in storage costs) make it
reasonable to suggest that such forensic logging is
feasible.
• Access For reasons of security, such a log should be
encrypted. Providing a way into it, thus becomes a
matter of accessing the appropriate key.
Current practice in dealing with encryption keys falls
under two headings: key escrow and key surrender.
The difficulties associated with key escrow (primarily
assuring the security of held keys and designing access
mechanisms) have prevented its widespread adoption.
Although there are civil liberties problems associated
with both forms of key access, the UK has adopted
a “key surrender” policy. With a lack of outcry (and
possible due scrutiny) that surprised commentators, a
policy of Government Access to Keys (GAK) was
embodied in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act (RIPA) 2000. Failure to disclose an encryption
key when presented with a court order demanding
its release to an appropriately authorised government
agency carries a maximum custodial sentence of 2
years (five years for terrorism and child pornography
offences). An as yet unimplemented provision of RIPA
allows for a sentence associated with the crime under
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investigation to be imposed should keys be withheld
(i.e., if a suspect is being investigated for murder,
and refuses to divulge a key, then the full sentence
for murder could be applied). Whilst the length of
sentence can be debated, this mechanism at least
provides a means of dealing with an unwillingness
to divulge keys.
It seems reasonable to assume that any keys protecting
a forensic log could be dealt with in a similar manner.
2) Practicality: The techniques of forensic readiness are
in the domain of the workplace. IT departments could activate
forensic readiness, but there is little incentive for private users
to do so and obviously there is a considerable disincentive for
anyone planning to commit a cybercrime.
For an evidence database to exist universally, it would
have to be built into the system (presumably by system
manufacturers at system-build time) and turned on (possibly
without the option to turn it off) by default.
For the (non-technical) majority of users, this might suffice
to provide a means of acquiring evidence should the need arise.
Achieving the necessary universality is more problematic as
suitably knowledgeable users could simply construct their own
non-forensic-ready system using existing technology. Thus
forensic-ready devices will only be adopted by the law-abiding,
in whom we have no interest.
A similar legislative technique to that used with encryption
technology could be employed, i.e., make it an offence to
operate a computer that is not forensically ready. This strategy
would suffer from the same “presumption of guilt” objection
that accompanies a sentence under RIPA, as well as the
difficulties of coping with legacy systems. It is also unclear
how well such a strategy might scale as computing becomes
ever closer to realising Weiser’s vision of the ubiquitous
computer [44].
A technical alternative to legislation might be to put in
place a requirement for forensic-readiness before a device
can access the Internet. Aside from the technical difficulties
with enforcing this, and problems with universal adoption
in different jurisdictions, how long would it be before an
alternative “Dark Internet” arose?
A further practical difficulty is associated with resourcing
such a scheme. Encryption is not yet widespread and many
police forces report a considerable backlog of digital forensics
cases. It is by no means clear that current administration
systems could cope with the added burden of obtaining court
orders for evidence-log disclosure.
3) Desirability: As a society, we have accepted the de-
sirability of law-enforcement being able to access private,
encrypted data, in appropriate circumstances, via RIPA 2000
and legislation of similar purpose in other jurisdictions. It
might thus seem that enforcing the deliberate availability of
something from which forensic reconstruction of user activity
might take place would be equally acceptable. After all, no
eyebrows are raised at the current ability to reconstruct the
same information as part of an investigation from the traces
‘accidentally’ left behind by the Operating System. However,
evidence-gathering techniques that require the active capture
of information are seen as an interception of communications
and require higher permission. A distinction is thus made
between the a-priori capture and the post-hoc reconstruction of
(potentially) identical information. The techniques of forensic
readiness fall across this divide by capturing data but not
allowing its authorised examination until after an event.
The distinction between a-priori and post-hoc evidence is
based on the need to preserve privacy: If a crime has been
committed then it is proportionate to acquire and reconstruct
evidence, however if a crime is only anticipated, then higher
permission for state intrusion upon the privacy of an individual
is required.
How should the use of forensic-readiness based evidence
thus be regulated? The proposal here is that it becomes a
routine technique and, for reasons of cost, speed and efficiency
there should be a low barrier to its use.
Stallman [45] has argued against the idea of the “treacher-
ous computer”, which the current forensic readiness proposal
might be thought to embody. However, a scheme in which the
keys that protect the forensic readiness backdoor belong to the
owner of the equipment, and are only used in the case of an
investigation, may offer sufficient protection from this charge.
The proposed forensic readiness scheme is predicated on
the (negative) incentive of a custodial sentence to gain access
to the necessary keys. Such a practice can give rise to concerns
over its abuse.
Another potential problem is the security of the back-door
itself. If it were universally deployed, then one break in would
compromise everyone’s security. The counter argument here
is that such a scheme is only necessary to counter “robust
security” in the first place.
4) Cloud Forensics Readiness: If cloud systems could be
made forensically ready, then obtaining evidence is at least
technically possible. Ensuring that the necessary legislation
is in-place and enforceable globally is another matter. The
primary objection to this is the trans-jurisdictional nature of
the Internet. Whilst the creation of a separate jurisdiction for
the Internet has been proposed [46], such solutions are a
long way from realisation. Obtaining appropriate international
cooperation is, however, a human problem rather than an
insoluble cryptographic one. Human problems, while seeming
intractable, can often be solved in ingenious ways, so this
offers some hope.
5) Forensics Readiness Conclusion: The forensic readiness
scheme outlined above is, at best, a compromise. Enforcing its
universal deployment seems problematic and it maybe that in
a “robust security” scenario we might simply have to accept
that it offers no hope against the determined, cybercriminal
with the knowledge to set up their own system. However by
building it into new devices, forensic readiness may offer some
utility against the average user who does not fiddle with the
security settings.
D. Fundamental Changes
Two extremely fundamental changes would also serve to
make things easier in terms of digital forensics. The first is that
the Internet no longer permits or supports anonymity. If every
Internet user has to prove their identify in an irrefutable way
to be permitted to use the Internet, it would make attribution
much easier to prove. This does, of course, compromise
individual privacy, and might not be an acceptable solution.
Another suggestion is that the Internet be treated as a
separate jurisdiction, much as is the case for independent
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countries. We would then be able to have laws that apply across
the Internet. This removes the need for forensics investigators
to negotiate multiple jurisdictions in order to carry out an
investigation. This would have to be accepted by nearly
200 independent countries across the planet, so is probably
infeasible.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Advances in computer security may be about to nullify
many of the current digital forensic techniques. Even if the
blackout is not total, now is the time to start thinking about
what happens, and what our options could be. One possible
option is the widespread use of a cryptographically protected
forensic readiness approaches with the disclosure of the keys
subject to laws similar to the UK’s RIPA.
Despite civil liberties concerns, we have, as a society,
already taken the step of demanding access to encryption
keys when necessary. Should we take the additional step of
demanding some form of universal forensic readiness?
Ultimately, this is not a technological debate about how
to facilitate a digital forensic investigation; rather it is an
ethical question about whether an individual has the right
to keep secrets from the state. In the encryption debate, we
have already decided that the answer is “no.” Currently a
compromise exists whereby those with appropriate technical
skills and knowledge can achieve a much greater degree of
privacy than the average citizen. The proposed approach might
remove such inequality.
Before developing such a technology, exceptionally careful
consideration should be given to the ethical implications of
the use of the technology — assuming the moral neutrality of
the technology and the acknowledgement that the investigators
may not always be the “good guys”. Of course, there is a de-
bate in the computer ethics literature as to whether technology
is value neutral or not, for example, see Johnson [47]
The evidence blackout is not yet with us, but appropriate
forensic readiness measures and legislation would take time to
develop. In the short term, it is possible that a greater emphasis
on surveillance and live seizure will be necessary, along with
an appropriate legal and operational framework.
The real challenge to the security/digital forensics commu-
nity is that we, as the ones who understand the technical issues
and their consequences, must be the ones who lead the debate.
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